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Abstract 
Taking a quarter-century to build a European internal market for electricity may seem an incredibly 
long journey. The aim of achieving a European-wide market might be reached, but we have gone 
through – and should continue to go through – a process subject to many adverse dynamics. The EU 
internal market may derail greatly in the coming years from the effects of a massive push for 
renewables, as well as a growing decentralization of the production-consumption loop. Moreover, a 
serious concern is the risk of a definitive fragmentation of the European electricity market due to 
uncoordinated national moves with respect to renewable support and capacity mechanisms. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
It took us a while to build an EU internal market for electricity. According to the Single European Act 
strategy of Commission President Jacques Delors, signed in 1986, it should have been implemented 
back in … 1992 – but that turned out to be only the first chapter of a 25-year – still on-going – 
process.  
Electricity sector liberalization started in the UK, followed by Norway, from the premise that while 
networks are natural monopolies requiring regulatory control, generation and trade are potentially 
competitive activities. The European liberalization process had been set out to simultaneously target 
two goals, i.e. first, to achieve competitive prices through the play of market forces, and second, to 
achieve a unified energy market and thus contribute to the “ever closer Union” that also will be 
conducive to ensuring secure energy supplies.  
Much was achieved since the early 1990s. Wholesale and retail markets were liberalized and the 
eligibility of customers became mandatory with a general increase in the choice of suppliers and tariffs 
(ACER/CEER, 2012). Even though there are still significant differences between Member States in 
terms of electricity generation structure, in general, we no longer have a patchwork of closed national 
energy systems, each with a national-only company controlling the entire electricity sector (EC, 2012). 
However, certain anti-market arrangements, such as ill-designed regulated end-user prices, still prevail 
in many countries. 
EU officials claim that a first version of this European-wide power market should work by 2015 – 
while we also know that this market is only going to implement the “old” goal of 1996, i.e. of the first 
EU Internal Electricity Market Directive.
1
 So one might wonder whether this will be the end of the 
journey, or just a coffee break? This EU’s internal electricity market is already seriously challenged by 
two waves of disruptive innovations – the renewable energy sources and the smartening of the energy 
system’s interactions. It is also challenged by exogenous shocks like the economic and financial crises, 
the Fukushima accident, or the flooding of cheap gas or cheap coal as a consequence of the US shale 
gas revolution. Accordingly, the goal of building a cohesive set of market arrangements in the EU 
cannot stop today or tomorrow and we already know that what we need will be of a different nature 
than in the 1990s.  
This paper argues that existing regulation – once fully implemented – adds up to a “European 
market”, even though many market arrangements differ from the perfect textbook case (Stoft, 2002; 
Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) (Section 2). However, since the initial power sector reform draft was 
neither conceived for systems with a massive penetration of renewables, nor for a decentralization of 
the production-consumption loop, there is, thus, a need to revisit regulatory practice in the whole 
spectrum of market and network arrangements (Section 3). This obvious need to adapt market design 
and regulation to “unforeseen” developments, however, is not the only challenge. What is currently 
becoming a growing concern is the risk of a deep fragmentation of the European electricity market due 
to uncoordinated national policy initiatives in the areas of renewable support and capacity mechanisms 
(Section 4). 
2. Europe’s single electricity market: Done by 2015? 
Taking a quarter-century (from 1990 to 2015) to build Europe’s internal market for electricity may 
seem an incredibly long journey as well as an example of the EU’s inability to accomplish serious 
industry reforms. But we should remember that no other “federal-style” government of a major 
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country (such as the US, Canada, Brazil, Russia, India or China) has achieved an internal, continent-
wide, open market for electricity so far.  
There are many good reasons for why Europe has been so slow with the liberalization of its 
electricity sector, as discussed in-depth in Glachant (2013). This market project aimed to open up 
national monopolies’ territories to foreigners, and that of course was a radical project that inevitably 
triggered huge and fierce opposition. Second, there was no wave of disruptive technological 
innovation – unlike in the case of telecoms – to challenge the incumbent energy giants. Third, 
electricity is a difficult product to trade as it requires hundreds of technical, legal and economic rules 
and standards to be agreed upon before it becomes tradable. Electricity is, after all, not more than a 
coordinated flow of electrons inside the millions of metallic wires of a gigantic interconnected 
network. Thus, electricity was considered for decades to be a typical “anti-market” product, best suited 
to natural or franchised monopolies. In fact, it has been the revolution in the ICT sector that has 
enabled new market arrangements in the electricity industry. New information and communication 
technologies gave us the tools to register every move of electricity generators and consumers alike – 
and so permitting one generator and one consumer to trade bilaterally in a market in parallel to the 
electron flow variations. The fourth reason is that the various national arrangements historically 
developed between industry players and public authorities cannot easily be merged at the EU level 
into a common scheme of interoperable markets. 
Several successive packages have then been needed to get (near to) all EU countries to implement 
compatible market arrangements. These include the European Commission’s three energy packages 
(adopted in 1996, 2003 and 2009, respectively) with the third
(2)
 calling for effective unbundling of 
generation and supply interests from the network and increased transparency of retail markets. Plus the 
establishment of an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in order to ensure 
effective coordination between national regulatory authorities and to take decisions on cross-border 
issues as well as the establishment of a European Network for Transmission System Operators 
(ENTSO-E) to push all grid operators to cooperate and to develop common commercial and technical 
codes or security standards. Moreover, a supplementary Infrastructure Package
(3) 
(adopted in 2013) 
defines rules to identify “projects of common interest” (PCIs) for infrastructures within a number of 
key trans-European energy corridors and areas. 
If today we ask ourselves whether these existing arrangements – once fully implemented – add up 
to a “European market”, the answer is yes. Whereas in the old times, trade across borders of areas 
controlled by different transmission system operators (TSOs) was mostly guided by security rather 
than economic considerations (Newbery, 2009), today we have a set of national, day-ahead wholesale 
markets that are mostly connected by implicit access given to physical interconnections from the trade 
floor. Any bid accepted in an exchange is simultaneously taken into account by the other exchanges 
and by the TSOs that manage the interconnections in between. Whenever there is significant 
congestion in the network, the European market splits into smaller regional or national markets until 
the congestion is ended. Secondly, we have more and more intraday and “real-time” arrangements by 
which offers of capacity and energy services also cross the borders of electrical zones. Third, the 
network is itself becoming more and more Europeanized. New grid operation codes are being 
conceived at the EU level, and a common strategic planning of the EU grid is taking place under the 
“Ten Year Network Development Plans” adopted bi-annually by ENTSO-E. The set of PCIs is also 
due to adapt our infrastructures better to the internal market’s needs. 
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Having said all this, it is nevertheless true that many anti-market arrangements still survive in too 
many European countries. At the wholesale level, byzantine market arrangements can be considered a 
“re-regulated access regime”, not only in France and Spain, but also in the UK in light of its new 
nuclear power program (UK Government, 2013). At the retail level, national governments have 
typically been reluctant to eliminate regulated end-user tariffs (de Suzzoni, 2009; ERGEG, 2010), 
which, however, discourage consumers from searching for alternative suppliers and, even more 
consequential, might prevent their exposure to more elaborate price signals. Unfair competition arises 
if these tariffs are not even aligned with wholesale prices and instead establish values deliberately 
below the minimum levels needed to cover the cost of energy (plus the regulated charges, which 
include also network tariffs, subsidies to renewables, taxes, et cetera). It may result in billions of euros 
of “tariff deficits”, as is notably the case in Spain already in the range of €25 billion (Marañón and 
Morata, 2011). Moreover, insufficient unbundling of distribution companies can be a serious obstacle 
to competition (Davies and Waddams Price, 2007; Nikogosian and Veith, 2011, and references 
therein), given that DSOs should act as “entry gates to retail markets […] making them an important 
influence on the level of competition as well” (CEER, 2013).  
The degree of market liberalization and competition still varies significantly across the EU and 
there is consensus on “room for more competition in power markets” (Lowe, 2011). National 
distortions have significant effects, but they cannot entirely block the internal market from 
functioning. However imperfect the EU’s internal market may be, there can be no doubt that we now 
are very near to the market target set in 1986. 
3. Europe’s single electricity market: But also done forever? 
It is far from guaranteed that this late internal market for energy will work forever. The many national 
compromises that have been realigned and harmonized in successive EU compromises dealt with the 
past, and aimed at opening up an EU market as conceived in the 1990s. However, many unforeseen 
yet dramatic changes have happened during the past 20 years. And these shifts from the initial power 
reform draft are not at the periphery of the system. They are at its core. We might call them the “major 
sins” of our EU market and network reform. Their actual number is heavily debated, let us say five to 
seven. 
What we now experience in the EU is not the former “common market – yes; common energy 
policy – never” which framed the European policy for the twenty years after 1986. We are now under 
a common energy policy frame designed at the EU level in 2007, when the European Council decided 
in Berlin to go for it. To this end, a set of Directives was approved in 2009, well-known today as the 
“20-20-20 climate and energy package”.4 Parallel to that, a wave of “smart” innovations, such as 
advanced electricity meters, automation and remote control technologies, et cetera is growing. You 
might end up with an internal market headache: the energy policy frame did move, and key 
technologies too are moving. 
3.1 Today’s generation mix is split into two opposite sets of generators 
In the early 1990s, we were pretty sure that most of the “steam for markets for power” was there. At 
that time generation did not seem like any type of natural monopoly except in very rare cases where 
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the size of the market is too small to duplicate the existing generation facility (pocket market). Free 
entry in generation, free choice of the fuel or primary resource, of the technology and the plant size (if 
not the location) should act to break up the old world of chartered territories for incumbent generation 
self-planning. This belief is heavily questioned today.  
Renewables are pushed in the electricity sector from outside the market. Both wind and solar PV 
energy run at the speed of their feed-in tariffs, or similar forms of subsidies (see e.g. Held et al., 2010; 
Marques and Fuinhas, 2012; Ragwitz, 2013). Germany, for instance, is already deploying renewable 
generation to “a spectacular – and destabilizing – extent” (Buchan, 2013). The country doubled its 
renewable generation capacity, which increased from less than 40 GW in 2008 to more than 80 GW 
today. With virtually no barriers for entering the electrical system, renewables enjoy considerable 
advantages: they always have guaranteed access to existing consumption, whereas conventional 
thermal generation only has access to the residual demand. In some EU countries, renewables also 
have the right to connect to the grid, and the grid owner has a duty to invest accordingly (Ecofys et al., 
2011).  
Step by step, a significant proportion of Europe’s thermal power plants are selling less and less 
energy while providing more and more “flexible capacity” for the electrical system. Some countries 
like the UK and France are looking at bridging that power generation revenue gap by re-organizing 
their national market’s capacity arrangements. Obviously enough, this might well break up the EU’s 
internal market, as some thermal generators would still be paid only for the energy they can sell, while 
others would get both those energy revenues and a national capacity payment. 
Even if there were to be no capacity splitting of the market, the present wholesale market might 
well undergo profound changes under the pressure of the growing share occupied by renewables. 
Large amounts of energy generated by renewables entering the wholesale market greatly depress the 
market price. The variable cost of generating electricity with renewables is low, and a competitive 
energy market uses the variable cost of marginal power generation to price the market as a whole. That 
price can then easily drop close to zero if the market is flooded by renewable energy. It can even fall 
below zero into negative prices, as is regularly observable within e.g. the German market area (EEX, 
2013). Some thermal generators in such situations prefer to pay for the right to keep their plants 
running, as thermal plants may face difficulties when reducing their output (they have to contend with 
huge output start-up costs and other dynamics).  
But in depressed conditions of this sort, how could the wholesale day-ahead market, that is the 
strongest backbone of the EU internal market, maintain its central position in the chain of electricity 
market arrangements that stretches from futures to real-time? The renewables push through feed-in 
tariffs largely locates the generation structure change in the realm of a public authority. The renewable 
priority of dispatch both reduces the market size remaining for non-renewable generators and breaks 
the price trend at which they can make money or break even. Hence, the generation set is deeply 
fractured into two opposite sets of generators: on the one hand “new” generators bearing no significant 
risk for capacity, volume or price thanks to e.g. feed-in tariffs/premiums and priority dispatch, and on 
the other hand the “conventional” generators bearing a significantly increased uncertainty, and 
foreseeably depressed future.  
3.2 Technological shocks can have unpredictable impacts on the available set of and relative cost of 
generation technologies 
The current EU Energy Roadmap scenarios (EC, 2011) build on a menu of essentially known 
technologies. They also have been criticized as relying on outdated cost assumptions for different low-
carbon technologies (Hirschhausen et al., 2013). For sure, 2050 is 37 years from now and thinking 40 
years ago, there had not been the oil crises yet. European energy markets had only national structures 
and electricity generation from renewable sources only included some hydro power. In 2050, the 
energy system will probably be extremely different than it is today. Composing an adequate portfolio 
The EU Internal Electricity Market: Done Forever? 
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of generation technologies has a very long time horizon; it is not only about looking ahead to the 2050 
decarbonization target, but to technological lock-ins that might persist even beyond (Ruester et al., 
2013d).  
On the one hand, some unforeseen technological shocks can eliminate technology options. For 
instance, a “2050 bridging role” was given to nuclear in the first version of the German energy 
strategy in late 2010, whereas one year later the country announced a nuclear phase out by 2022 as a 
response to the Fukushima accident.  
On the other hand, unforeseen technological revolutions can also add new or cheaper means of 
generation and decarbonization. For instance, whereas the International Energy Agency in its World 
Energy Outlook 2007 (at the time when the 20-20-20 strategy was adopted by the European Council) 
predicted a moderate growth for US gas production. Four years later, the World Energy Outlook 2011 
was centered around a possible “golden age of gas”. Assuming that the US will become a large-scale 
exporter of cheap gas and that it is possible to replicate its experience in other parts of the world (from 
the UK to Poland or Ukraine; from India to China), the availability of cheap gas in the market would 
allow for a degree of decarbonization at low cost (or even net benefits: one should decarbonize to 
make more money in the market). The ‘rational’ price of carbon might then fall extremely low under 
the push of shale gas as a market-based decarbonization technology. Hence, cheap gas may not only 
substitute dirty coal but also expensive renewables.  
Certainly, technological developments, shocks and revolutions can have important, unpredictable 
impacts on the available set of and relative cost of generation technologies
5
. How can we stimulate 
sufficient innovation in low-carbon technologies in case of a degree of decarbonization at very low 
cost and the resulting lack of a strong carbon price signal? How will this interact with the market and 
network arrangements that we use in the EU as our common market model or network operation 
frame? 
3.3 Transition from ‘top-down’ towards ‘distributed local’ electricity systems  
We observe changes in the generation mix not only in the form of a shift from conventional fossil 
fuels towards renewables, but also in the form of a shift from centralized towards decentralized 
resources. More mature technologies for local renewable generation, decreased investment costs 
thereof and ambitious national support schemes led to a significant market penetration of distributed 
generation (DG) in many EU countries, and an important share of renewable energy is not fed 
anymore into the transmission grid but at distribution grid level. In Germany, for instance, “in many 
places, the DG output of distribution networks already exceeds local load, sometimes by multiple 
times,” see Eurelectric (2013). 
Distributed storage might also become viable soon at all voltage levels and in significant amounts, 
becoming a critical component of the grid of the future (Beaudin et al., 2010; Ruester et al., 2013b). 
Likewise, the use of electric vehicles charging from local grids, and possibly also the ability to inject 
power back to it is expected to grow (see e.g. Kampman et al., 2011; Pasaoglu et al., 2012). In addition, 
recent innovations in metering and communication devices enable active demand response and 
enhanced distribution automation. Whereas at the beginning of the liberalization process, demand 
response has been considered only interesting for large, typically industrial, customers (S. Littlechild 
is one of the very few having always advocated for retail competition and demand response), 
technological advances today make this concept appealing also for residential consumers (see e.g. 
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 Thanks to solar PV panels, millions of 
these smart consumers are already or might soon also be producers of electricity. This is famously 
turning these consumers into “prosumers” and it may therefore have a significant impact on both the 
offer and demand sides of these fast changing segments of energy markets.  
This newly emerging broad range of “distributed energy resources (DER)” (Ruester et al., 2013c) – 
be it distributed generation, local storage, electric vehicles or demand response –also has the potential 
to drive significant changes in the planning and operation of the power systems. Traditional power 
systems had been designed to send electricity top-down from generation connected to the transmission 
level to end consumers connected at distribution grids. And the distribution grid had been designed 
accordingly such that there were no significant bottlenecks or congestion. In contrast, today’s 
distribution systems are challenged by new features such as increased volatility of net demand and 
peak demand fluctuations, reverse flows from the distribution to the transmission grid in times of local 
generation exceeding local demand. It also increases the feasibility and the likelihood of having 
energy and power trades at the local level, “du jamais vu”! 
All these changes bring challenges for electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) and their 
regulation alike, ranging from increasing uncertainty in distribution grid flows to the necessary 
integration of new DER business models into retail markets. As we can already see that the 
distribution grids might become the new core of the EU internal market, the key question we should 
ask, from a market policy point of view, is how will they operate and how will they be regulated and 
monitored? Should we avoid a situation in which several thousand DSOs throughout Europe fragment 
at national and sub-national level the existing EU internal market by spontaneously diverging through 
myriad of different rules and arrangements? Nobody yet knows how the corresponding new services, 
whether communication-related or energy-related, and new markets that are immediately responsive to 
retail demand, will evolve. 
3.4 Network neutrality  
Considering network neutrality as another important sin (“unforeseen” shift) from the initial power 
reform draft may be controversial while it should not because it actually is a major departure. As a 
natural monopoly, networks had to be detached from market operation, neutral vis-à-vis fuel mix and 
cost-based for hosting generation capacity. The main positive outcome that we expected from the 
networks in the liberalization process was to reduce their costs to their bones, à la RPI-X formula 
(Ofgem, 2009; Eurelectric, 2010). Transmission as well as distribution grids, however, are now seen 
as the vanguard of a significant shift of the whole industry to new business models.  
Transmission grid and TSO regulation:  
Challenges accompanying the connection and integration of large-scale renewable energy sources are 
manifold. First, we observe an increasingly unbalanced regional distribution of supply and demand 
and therefore the transmission grid needs to be reinforced – inside countries but also via extended 
interconnection capacities – to be able to transport electricity from its sources to its sinks. Second, we 
expect an increasing share of remote generation, outside the today’s European core grid, and new 
lines need to be built to connect e.g. offshore wind parks, or one day solar power plants in Northern 
Africa. Furthermore, the economic features of these new resources may presumably be different 
(different timing of investment and construction; and technically: different load following, production 
ramping and dispatch firmness profiles). The proper development and operation of networks, far from 
staying neutral, will strongly interact with the new services, the new users and the new usages of 
transmission services.  
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For the coming three decades, the Commission estimates that investments in transmission network 
infrastructures in the range of €100-200 billion are to be realized (EC, 2011b). The Infrastructure 
Package could help to identify priority projects; a methodology for cost-benefit analyses is currently 
developed in order to facilitate the selection of such PCIs (see also Meeus et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
serious challenges for investors, grid operators and regulators remain. How to mobilize the required 
funding, given that under current evolution of transmission tariffs, only half of planned investment 
could be financed (Henriot, 2013)? How to allocate grid costs, considering that the way we designed 
grid tariffs for our yesterday’s priorities cannot stand forever and that instead new grid tariffs have to 
be aligned with the new system needs (see e.g. Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga, 2009; Ruester et al., 2012)?
7
 
Distribution grid and DSO regulation: 
For high amounts of distributed energy resources (DER), the total costs of business-as-usual 
management of distribution networks will likely increase in most systems. Substantial future 
investments are also required to properly connect all these new DER to the distribution networks, to 
enable the system to deal with increased volatility of net demand and peak demand fluctuations, and to 
set up an ICT infrastructure that empowers DSOs to employ DER for their daily grid operations. DER 
offer a new set of instruments for grid operation and thereby a tool for DSOs to perform their tasks of 
electricity distribution. DER also allow for an active distribution system management and have the 
potential to decrease the total costs of DSOs compared to not relying on these new resources in local 
system management, see Cossent (2010), Pieltan-Fernandez et al. (2011), and Yap (2012). 
As discussed in-depth in Ruester et al. (2013b), the use of DER in distribution grid management 
can decrease OPEX compared to a business-as-usual treatment of these resources. In contrast, how the 
use of DER will impact CAPEX is not obvious. Integrating DER in grid operation procedures can 
decrease CAPEX in the longer-run if grid investments can be deferred, for instance, relying on DER to 
solve local congestion can postpone investments in new lines (CAPEX hence being substituted for 
OPEX). On the other hand, in the short-run, significant expenditures for investments into grids and 
ICT infrastructures supporting grid monitoring and automation are needed upfront. A challenging task 
for regulators, therefore, remains to design sound regulation that efficiently incentivizes DSOs to 
engage in active system management and, thus takes account of the changing OPEX and CAPEX 
structures and of trade-offs among both (Cossent, 2013).  
To end, grid operators are much more than “simple regulated infrastructure monopolies” (like 
bridge or road) where it might suffice that regulation primarily aims to decrease their costs. Instead, 
grid operators are becoming important market facilitators who shall favor all welfare-enhancing 
business models under any future market development. Both transmission and distribution grids are 
supposed to become smarter platforms for deeper market interactions. Regulators realize that there is 
more to competition than setting price equal to cost (Littlechild, 2012; Khalfallah and Glachant, 2012). 
In this vein, grids may be remunerated for hosting more of the “socially preferred” generation mix or 
even to start innovating and running pilots or demonstrations (e.g. offshore grids). At the end of the 
day, average grid costs will go up with increased investment costs. The low cost, market distant and 
energy mix neutral grid revolution may fade away. 
3.5 Market integrity  
A highly concentrated industry structure is detrimental to the development of a functioning and 
efficient internal energy market. Our initial wisdom was that a “good enough” generation structure is a 
necessary pre-condition to market opening: why bother opening markets which are structurally unable 
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to be competitive? This was a key question in the UK in 1990 as it is in France today. Illiquid 
wholesale markets exposed to dominant market players, might not only have negative consequences in 
terms of potential market power abuse (see e.g. Green, 2006; Weigt and Hirschhausen, 2008), but 
might also delay the transformation of balancing mechanisms into integrated balancing markets or the 
development of further interconnection.  
Improving the industry structure, however, has been and still is one of the main difficulties in the 
construction of the internal energy market as Member States are sovereign in defining their industrial 
structures (Glachant and Lévêque, 2009). The Commission has no right to intervene except in cases of 
major mergers and acquisitions.  
Competition has to be “at least workable”8 (Bergman, 2009). The consensus was a magic number 
of five or more competitors, none with more than a 20% market share. The Californian crisis with 
FERC blindly sticking to its Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index prejudice opened many eyes 
to other unacceptable deficiencies. Wolak (2003) showed that more accurate definitions of market 
power and more sophisticated econometrics might be able to identify most of the “new industrial 
economics” way in which market power is abused in power markets.  
However, many other doors remained open between market and manipulation. How are thieves or 
criminals like Enron and others in the financial markets (maybe Barclays or JP Morgan in the US) to 
be dealt with and how are they to be deterred from destroying the market from inside? If we cannot 
guarantee ex-ante transparency and integrity in power markets, how can we rely on these markets to 
bridge physically (unit commitment, dispatch, capacity allocation and congestion management) and 
financially (price arbitrage, portfolio and risk management, et cetera)? Today we still know more 
about the “fire alarm” strategy of monitoring (how to assess ex-post the fairness of actual behaviors on 
existing markets) and less on the “police patrol” strategy (how to ex-ante prevent manipulations or 
crimes). An obvious link between ex-ante and ex-post strategies is how we conceive the definition and 
the collection of data, the architecture and languages of data bases and the screening tools, the market 
models and the software. Moreover, we know more about “country market” monitoring but did we 
achieve enough across borders and across markets? Finally, another key issue is how to manage the 
loop between market monitoring, market investigation and market fixing.  
3.6 Market Design  
Market players cannot entirely design power markets by themselves because power markets are 
structurally incomplete (Smeers, 2003a; 2003b). We saw that market players can easily trade energy 
until the “market gate closure”, but they cannot easily trade the corresponding transmission capacity 
and reserve availability needed to implement this “ex-ante” energy trade. To alleviate these market 
difficulties, power markets play the wholesale trade through a series of steps, which mimic the simple 
offer and demand arrangement of a textbook market. Power markets are actually “sequences of 
markets” from the pre-commitment of plants at day(s) ahead to the real-time balancing of actual 
injections and withdrawals, via the allocation of transmission capacity and the necessary management 
of unforeseen congestions.  
Making electricity marketable actually means to complete the textbook market with more central 
coordination, more third party intervention and market intermediation. If one wants to make electricity 
a homogenous good easier to contract and to trade, one has to deal with the growing gap between the 
actual physical flows and the notional traded good. The very nature and the right amount of “third 
party” coordination in power markets are still under discussion after twenty years. We not only 
                                                     
8
 In this vein, the author refers to a market that is “perhaps less perfect than the textbook vision of a competitive market but 
yet generally free from monopolistic pricing and various forms of collusion and manipulation.” 
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disagree on how to design complements or auxiliaries to the market but we also disagree on what to 
keep free for trade.  
We did not really foresee how deeply market trade and market interactions will depend on the 
market arrangements agreed by policy makers here and there. Even if we bypass more than a decade 
of wholesale storyboard (see also e.g. Boisseleau, 2004; Zachmann, 2008; Glachant, 2010) – UK Pool 
and New Trading Arrangement, Nord Pool, Germany’s dual competing power exchanges, et cetera – 
today we are still discovering how to connect the existing market areas across the existing electrical 
control zones. Should we “couple” the existing markets within a harmonized nodal frame? Or only 
with an explicit… or implicit… transmission capacity auctioning? Only on the day-ahead horizon? 
Should then it be “flow-based” or with rigid predetermined “net transfer capacity”? Should we also 
couple for intraday trade? With a few successive windows of price fixing? Or with continuous 
trading? Should we extend to pooling adjacent markets on their balancing horizon? Through a “loose” 
common pool of offers where several system operators may pick up for their needs? Or through a 
“tight” cross-border common management of all balancing options? Why not then a loose system 
operator auxiliary (like CORESO) or a more substantial EU light ISO? 
4. Conclusion: Towards a (re-) fragmentation of the European electricity market? 
Building a European internal market for electricity has been a slow process of some 25 years, but it is 
soon to be achieved. We Europeans conceived our internal market arrangements “our way”, even 
though many other ways were, or still are, envisageable. Europe could, for example, have opened up 
the wholesale market without opening the retail market. Or it could have made opening the wholesale 
market mandatory with a centralized exchange system operating a single price algorithm, just as 
England did for more than 10 years. 
In the end, it has been – and should continue to be – a process subject to lots of dynamics. What we 
now call the EU internal market is in many elements a compromise among all the other national-level 
compromises. It is so far from being a perfect mechanism capable of serving us for everything, 
whatever the prevailing conditions. This emerging EU market may suffer greatly in the coming years 
from a massive increase in renewable energies or from a deep decentralization of the production-
consumption loop. The future, as is already debated a post-2020 strategy, is far from clear. What is 
clear, though, is that the introduction of new ICT-based technologies could radically modify the 
economical and physical functioning of the electricity system and as a result the functioning of the 
market. Therefore, what is urgently needed now is “a realistic design for the transition process from 
today’s low-ICT, high-carbon energy systems to a high-ICT, low-carbon system of tomorrow” 
(Vasconcelos, 2013). 
The need to adapt market design and network regulation to “unforeseen” developments is not the 
only challenge. What is currently becoming a serious concern is the risk of a re-fragmentation of the 
European electricity market due to uncoordinated national moves. It is true that national diversity has 
first and foremost been a predictable result of the nature of the compromises made when scoping the 
first electricity directive. The 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 Packages successfully managed to reduce the scope of this 
diversity. However, we observe now an again increasing impact of national initiatives. Diverse 
renewable support schemes resulted in a patchwork of effective, but market-distorting subsidies (see 
e.g. Ragwitz, 2013; CEER, 2013b). Moreover, a number of Member States consider introducing 
various forms of capacity mechanisms. In Germany, for instance, it targets the high share of 
intermittent generation blowing conventional generation out of the market and therefore out of money; 
whereas in the UK it reacts to a shortage in overall capacity due to the shutdown of several dirty 
power plants. 
We know that the Commission will use its powers for policing state aids and, for instance, approve 
national capacity mechanisms only if the respective Member State devotes funds to improve its 
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interconnections with neighbors (Buchan, 2013). It does not tell if European Competition Policy will 
be the tool able to heal the many wounds of EU market arrangements. Our electricity markets and 
networks are at the gate of a sea of perils. There is no guarantee that they will sail till the next safe 
harbor. 
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